Job Market Paper

  1. “Which Comparison Counts? Information, Benchmarking, and Electoral Accountability” [Paper]
    Abstract

    Field experiments have mixed findings on how and to what extent information changes voting behavior. Many factors may explain these mixed results, but one that remains under-explored is how benchmarking, or the presentation of performance information relative to other governments, can change interpretation. In a pre-registered survey fielded in Mexico with both descriptive and experimental components, I examine how benchmarking changes voting behavior. I find that respondents prefer benchmark municipalities that are geographically proximate, highly populated, and governed by the same party coalition as the respondent's municipality. When randomly assigned to treatment conditions that vary whether partisan benchmarks are shown to respondents, I find that only same-coalition comparisons change respondents' intentions to vote for an incumbent. This effect is driven in part by respondents updating negatively about incumbent politicians relative to opposition party coalitions.

Working Papers

  1. “Overcoming Uncertainty: How Voters Learn about Opposition Parties Under Competitive Authoritarian Systems” Under Review. [Paper]
    Abstract

    How do opposition parties gain electoral support in competitive authoritarian systems? Electing opposition parties is risky when their ideological positioning is uncertain, but voters can reduce this uncertainty by observing and learning from neighboring subnational governments’ experiences with opposition leadership. I examine how opposition governance in neighboring municipalities affects support for opposition candidates in municipal elections in 1990s Mexico. Using a close-election regression discontinuity design, I find that municipalities with exposure to PRD-governed neighbors increased their support for the PRD by 12-15 percentage points compared to municipalities with PRI-governed neighbors. This effect is specific to the PRD and does not extend to the PAN, a better-known opposition party. These findings provide insight into how governance information spreads across electoral borders and highlight that opposition parties are not necessarily perceived equally in competitive authoritarian systems.

  2. “Geographic Representation and Information Capacity in the European Commission” Conditionally Accepted at European Union Politics. [Paper]
    Abstract

    The European Union prioritizes geographic representation of member states when recruiting staff. Many assume a trade-off between expertise and geographic representation, where the former increases capacity and the latter increases legitimacy. However, this paper provides evidence that geographic representation can enhance bureaucratic information capacity. Using the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs as a case study, I provide evidence that increasing representation of bureaucrats from a member state is associated with higher accuracy in that state's economic forecasts. This association decreases as member state representation within the Commission increases. These findings suggest that prioritizing geographic balance in the EU need not come at the cost of information capacity, and may in fact improve it.

Works in Progress

  1. “When the Nomads Arrive: Foreign Remote Workers and Electoral Backlash in Latin America”

  2. “Electoral Losses and Candidate Electability” with Dot Sawler

  3. “The Straw That Breaks the Voter’s Back: Corruption and Electoral Punishment” with Ruth Holloway